We analyse the relationship between corporate dividend policy and firm lifecycle in a low-disclosure regime, where domestic firms have an incentive to use dividends to build capital market reputation among external investors. We use a range of lifecycle indicators from the extant literature and find that, as predicted by the lifecycle model, dividend payouts increase along the lifecycle until peaking in the mature stage. Furthermore, dividends are positively related to growth opportunities. In all lifecycle stages, firms with relatively larger growth opportunities pay relatively larger dividends. We find that firms in lowdisclosure regimes, engage in reputation-building behaviour, not just in the early stages of their lifecycle but also in the mature stage.
show that this also applies to other developed markets (Denis and Osobov, 2008) ; and to the dividend amount and not just to the likelihood of paying a dividend (Brockman and Unlu, 2009) .
A connected strand of literature relates corporate dividend policy to country-level institutions and disclosure standards. Beck et al. (2006) show that country-level institutional development is inversely related to financing obstacles, prompting firms to implement their own strategies to overcome these obstacles. Brockman and Unlu (2011) test the lifecycle-inclusive disclosure standards versions of the agency outcome and substitution models of dividends (La Porta et al., 2000) and find that the 'dividendpayout-disclosure standards' relationship is u-shaped. The probability of paying a dividend is highest when disclosure standards are either weak or strong. Where disclosure standards are weak, the costs of debt and equity capital are often prohibitively high (see Botosan, 1997; and Sengupta, 1998 for the link between disclosure quality and the cost of capital). In such countries, growth firms respond by establishing a history of paying large dividends to foster trust with outside investors and build capital market reputation. 1 This reduces financing constraints and allows them to grow (Gan et al., 2013) . 2 Where disclosure standards are strong, the cost of capital is lower implying that firms have less need to engage in reputation-building strategies. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the lifecycle model of dividends receives empirical support in countries with high disclosure standards, e.g. DeAngelo et al. (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008) among others. Interestingly, Brockman and Unlu (2011) report similar findings for low-disclosure regimes. They find that the likelihood of paying a dividend increases with RE/TE but do not address the issue of whether or not the dividend amount varies over the firm lifecycle. Shao et al. (2013) show that RE/TE is positively and statistically significantly related to being a dividend payer but statistically indistinguishable from zero using dividends-to-sales (the dividend amount), in countries where creditor rights are weak. However, it remains an unanswered question if the magnitude of dividends differs between mature and growth firms in countries with low-disclosure requirements, where dividends may be used to establish capital market reputation. Arguably it is the size of the dividend that provides the strongest signal of a firm's intent to protect prospective shareholders, thus incentivising firms with greater growth potential to pay larger dividends. 3 In this paper, we build on these two strands of the literature to address two issues. Firstly, we test the lifecycle model of dividends using data from Korea, a country with low-disclosure standards relative to developed markets, focusing on both the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount.
Secondly, we try to reconcile the dividend-lifecycle relationship with the reputation-building strategies pursued by firms in countries with weak institutions. Ignoring reputation-building motives, the extant literature suggests that mature companies pay larger dividends than growth companies. However, where these motives are strong, early-stage firms may potentially pay comparable or larger dividends than their 1 Using dividend payouts to build external financing capacity is also highlighted by Masters et al. (2016) . Using a sample of publicly-traded U.S. firms, they show that contrary to conventional wisdom, financially constrained firms pay dividends, and increase their dividend immediately prior to a SEO announcement. 2 The notion that firms can build capital market reputation using dividend payout is not new. Campbell and Turner (2011) find evidence in support of the agency substitution model of dividends in Victorian Britain. 3 Using large dividends to build reputation involves a trade-off for corporate insiders. Since expropriation risk is higher in countries with weak legal protection/disclosure standards, insiders forgo large private gains by paying large dividends rather than retaining the funds. However, if this form of reputation building is effective in reducing firmlevel financing constraints, corporate insiders gain as the value of their (legal) cash flow rights increases as firms fund growth opportunities. Outside investors are prepared to fund these growth opportunities as the dividend signal is deemed both costly (for insiders) and credible. The larger the dividend the more costly it is for corporate insiders, hence the larger the signal sent to outside investors. Doidge et al. (2004) model this trade-off for firms who cross-list in the U.S. and use Level 2/3 ADRs (or an ordinary listing) as a bonding device. more-established counterparts. In addition to the RE/TE ratio, we employ a range of lifecycle measures such as firm age, size-and industry-adjusted age, multiclass linear discriminant analysis, and the composite proxy developed by Dickinson (2011) . To the best of our knowledge, no study of the lifecycle model of dividends to date has used this wide range of lifecycle indicators. Using more than one lifecycle proxy insures that our findings are not driven by one specific lifecycle measure and allows us to assess the interpretation of some of these measures in a low-disclosure regime.
Our results produce a number of interesting findings. Firstly, firms engage in reputation-building behaviour. Firms with relatively larger growth opportunities tend to pay larger dividends, in contrast to the findings for firms in more developed, high-disclosure regimes. Secondly, reputation building through dividend payout policy is not the sole preserve of early-stage firms. We find that such behaviour is also a characteristic of mature firms, i.e. mature firms with relatively higher growth opportunities continue to pay higher dividends to signal to potential investors that they are committed to protecting external providers of capital. Thirdly, the evidence supports the lifecycle model of dividends. Dividends increase over the lifecycle and peak during the mature stage. However, this story emerges because both growthand mature-stage firms pursue reputation-building strategies.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our four lifecycle proxies and contains a description of the data. Section 3 presents our empirical methodology and discusses our results. Finally, section 4 concludes. (2006), we use the ratio of retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE) (or assets, RE/TA), where total equity (TE) is the sum of retained (RE) and contributed equity. The underlying premise is that young firms have little or no retained equity and rely on contributed (external) equity, resulting in low RE/TE ratios. In contrast, mature firms with positive net cash inflows from operations coupled with a diminishing investment opportunity set have greater access to internal funds (retained equity) and less need for contributed equity. Hence, mature firms are expected to have large RE/TE ratios.
Second, we employ the lifecycle proxy of Dickinson (2011) . It classifies firms into one of five lifecycle stages, namely introduction (birth), growth, maturity, shake-out and decline based on the combined signs of net cash flows from operating, financing, and investing activities. Net cash flows can be positive or negative, resulting in eight possible cash flow combinations. 4 Firm classification is grounded in economic theory. For example, firms in the introductory stage invest more than they divest, spend more cash than they can generate internally, and issue more capital than they retire/repurchase, resulting in negative net cash flows from investments and operations, and a positive net cash flow from financing. In our empirical application, we follow Faff et al. (2016) Rather than increase monotonically with maturity, the 'firm age-maturity' relationship is inverted ushaped; by definition, new firms are young in age but are also more likely to fail meaning that young firms 4 See Appendix 1 for these eight cash flow combinations. 5 
Other variables
Korea is chosen as it is a large market, where firms have a strong incentive to engage in reputation-building strategies to overcome country-level barriers to investment and hence provides an interesting study of the dividend-lifecycle model in an emerging market. 6 As a country, it has relatively low-disclosure standards. Its CIFAR score of 68 places it in the bottom tercile of the CIFAR score distribution. 7 governance scores which are only available over this period. We exclude firms in the financial and utility industries and firms with negative total equity, missing retained equity, and missing control variables.
Once we exclude firms with missing TE and RE, all firms have non-negative RE. Our final sample of firms is described in Table 1 We measure dividend payout using dividends-to-sales, dividends-to-assets, and 'payer'.
Dividends-to-sales (assets) are measured as total common dividends scaled by total sales (assets). 'Payer' is a binary dummy variable which equals one if the firm pays a dividend in year t and zero otherwise. It is common in empirical studies of dividend payout to control for firm-specific determinants of this policy, and we control for firms' growth opportunities, corporate governance, total equity (as opposed to retained equity), firm size, cash holdings, profitability, asset tangibility, leverage, and cash flow uncertainty.
We use market-to-book of assets (MBA) to control for growth opportunities. Adam and Goyal (2008) show that a firm's investment opportunity set is best proxied by MBA. We calculate the rank decile MBA on an annual basis based on a 3-year average (including the current year). 8 La Porta et al. (2000) show that dividends can be an outcome of, or substitute for, governance and hence we include the include both RE/TE and the ratio of total equity to total assets (TE/TA) in our regressions to distinguish the impact of total equity financing (TE) from the composition of equity financing (RE/TE). They find that dividend payout is positively related to both retained and total equity and hence both the composition (RE/TE) and size (TE/TA) of total equity influences dividend payout. Firm size is the rank decile of assets (in dividends-to-sales regressions) and rank decile of sales (in dividends-to-assets regressions). Cash holdings is cash to assets, profitability is measured as operating income (EBIT) to book assets, asset tangibility is gross property plant and equipment (PPE) to assets, leverage is captured by total debt to book assets, and following Chay and Suh (2009), cash flow uncertainty is measured as the standard deviation of operating income to total assets over the most recent four years. Furthermore, we include a 'Chaebol' dummy which is one if the firm belongs to a business group and zero otherwise.
There is little consensus on the payout policies of Chaebol and non-Chaebol (independent) firms. Gul and Kealey (1999) find no difference in dividend payout between the two groups, while Hwang et al.
(2013) conclude that dividends paid by Chaebol firms are lower than independent firms. In all regressions, we include a full set of industry and time dummies. Appendix 2 describes all variables and presents summary statistics for our sample of Korean firms.
Panel B of Table 1 .66 and 24.88%, respectively. Interestingly, it is mature, and not growth firms which score highest in terms of growth opportunities. Firm age increases monotonically as firms mature. However, if we separate shake-out from decline firms, we observe the inverted u-shaped relation between firm age and lifecycle as anticipated. 2. Discussion of results firms belong to the group of firms in the lowest (highest) 25%. All other firms are classified as mature.
Preliminary analysis
Dividend payout is proxied using dividends-to-sales (%), and dividends-to-assets (%). MLDA, Dickinson, and RE/TE present a consistent story for the relationship between lifecycle stage and dividend payout policy. Dividend payout increases as firms mature, and mature/old firms pay the largest dividends of all firms. MLDA and Dickinson agree on the nature of the dividend-lifecycle relationship, although the differences in dividend payouts between lifecycle stages is more pronounced using the former. For example, using dividends-to-sales, the median growth firm pays almost the same dividend amount in both classification schemes. However, the median mature firm's dividend payout is 0.89 under MLDA, yet just 0.62 under Dickinson. The bottom rows of Table 3 say that dividend payouts fall as firms age.
In Table 4 we show how dividends change for firms who transition between lifecycle stages. We focus on transitions from introduction to growth and growth to mature (old using RE/TE) lifecycle stages, and present transitions from quartiles 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 4, using firm age. The number of transition firms is reported in parentheses. In general, dividend payouts increase as firms transition along their lifecycle. The size of the dividend changes differs by transition type. Under MLDA, the largest increase in dividend payouts occurs when firms transition from the introduction to the growth stage.
Interestingly, growth firms continue to increase dividends once they mature. Dickinson and RE/TE say that the largest change in dividend payouts is observed when young/growth firms reach the mature stage.
However, since growth firms always pay larger dividends once they mature, the analysis presented in Tables 3 and 4 present a version of the lifecycle model of dividends whereby mature firms pay larger dividends than growth firms, irrespective of the lifecycle measure employed.
Regression based tests of the lifecycle model of dividends
We estimate dividend payout regressions for the dividend amount (equation 1) and the likelihood of a firm paying a dividend (equation 2). The equations are specified as follows:
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The dividend amount equations are estimated using ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered by firms (Petersen, 2009 ), while the payer specification is estimated using logistic regression. Each regression contains a full set of firm, industry and time controls. We include the MBA-decile in our regressions to capture reputation-building and not lifecycle effects per se, even though finance theory implies that MBA falls as firms mature. 9 Table 5 presents our coefficient estimates from estimating equation 1 using dividends-to-sales (%) and dividends-to-assets (%). We estimate equation 1 separately for each of our lifecycle proxies. The estimated coefficient for RE/TE (and RE/TA, unreported) is positive and significant which is consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis proposed by DeAngelo et al. (2006) . The same pattern emerges when we use RE/TE LC, since we observe that firms in later lifecycle stages pay larger dividends. Simultaneously, the coefficient on TE/TA is positive and highly significant, which suggests that both total equity (TE/TA) and the retained proportion of total equity (RE/TE) matter for the dividend amount. These same dividend-lifecycle patterns emerge when we use MLDA, and to a lesser extent Dickinson, to proxy for lifecycle. RE/TE is excluded where lifecycle is proxied using MLDA because MLDA uses RE/TE to classify firms to lifecycle stages. Going beyond the lifecycle measure, we find that the estimated coefficient on the MBA decile variable is positive and statistically significant using dividends-to-sales and dividends-to-assets. This is Dickinson. The former suggests that from growth through shake-out/decline, there is no statistical difference in the propensity to pay a dividend; while the latter has a similar finding for growth and mature firms, it finds that firms in the shake-out/decline stage pay significantly lower dividends than earlier-stage firms. 10 As a robustness test, we follow DeAngelo et al. (2006) and include an indicator variable which is 1 if the firm paid a dividend in the previous year. Estimated coefficients for RE/TE and RE/TA are reduced, sometimes by more than half, but they always remain statistically significant. Other variables are unaffected by its inclusion. Coefficients on the lagged dividend variable are always positive, consistent with the stylized fact that dividends tend to be sticky.
The estimated coefficient on the MBA decile variable which was positive and statistically significant using dividends-to-sales and dividends-to-assets, loses statistical significance in the dividend payer regressions. This implies that firms with relatively large growth opportunities are no more likely to pay dividends but when they do, they tend to be larger. In the payer regressions, it is only size, profitability, and cash flow uncertainty, and to a lesser extent TE/TA, which are consistent and reliable determinants of dividend payout. Larger firms with stable cash flows (profits) pay dividends. 11 In Tables 7 and 8 we explore in detail the influence of growth opportunities (MBA) on dividend payouts, and in particular on the dividend-lifecycle relationship. In Table 7 we estimate equation 1 separately for each MLDA lifecycle stage and assess the influence of the MBA decile variable on dividend payouts in each lifecycle stage. In the bottom rows of Table 7 , we report the proportion of the total explained variation in dividend payouts attributable to each variable. Interestingly while we find that the growth opportunities measure is a statistically significant determinant of dividend payout in all four lifecycle stages, they exert their largest influence in the mature lifecycle stage. The estimated coefficient on the MBA decile variable is largest for mature firms, and growth opportunities explain almost a third of the total variation in dividend payouts. For firms in the growth stage, the corresponding figure is 20%. Only TE/TA is more important than growth opportunities in explaining the variation in dividend payout, in the growth and mature lifecycle stage. These findings suggest that firms with relatively large growth opportunities use dividends to build reputation capital regardless of lifecycle stage, and reputation building is not restricted to firms in the "growth" lifecycle stage.
In Table 8 , we explore this issue further by estimating dividend-lifecycle regressions by strength of growth opportunities (above-and below-median MBA). If reputation building is predominantly practiced by early-stage firms, then we may expect that for firms with relatively large growth opportunities, the differential in dividend payouts between growth and mature firms should narrow relative to that observed for firms with low growth opportunities and relative to the whole sample. This is not what we observe. Irrespective of the level of growth opportunities, mature firms always pay larger dividends than firms in the introduction stage and, using dividends-to-assets, they also pay larger dividends than growth firms. Even given large growth opportunities, the collective analysis presented in 11 Appendix 3 presents results of robustness checks, which show that our dividend-lifecycle tests are robust to different MLDA specifications. Tables 7 and 8 suggest that if anything, reputation building serves to maintain, and not reduce, the difference in dividend payouts that exists between firms in growth and mature lifecycle stages.
Conclusion
We analyze the influence of reputation building on the dividend-lifecycle relationship in a lowdisclosure regime where the incentives for firms to undertake confidence building strategies with investors are strong. Since DeAngelo et al. Focusing on the lifecycle model of dividends, the different classification methods tell a broadly similar story and are supportive of the model. Dividends increase across the lifecycle spectrum, peaking in the mature stage before falling in the final shakeout / decline stage. However, reputation building also plays a significant role in determining the size of dividend payouts. Contrary to the premise underlying the adoption of RE/TE as a lifecycle indicator, we find that dividends are positively related to growth opportunities, implying that firms use dividend policy to reassure investors and thereby build reputation to overcome country-level institutional barriers to investment. Furthermore, the largest growth of dividends is observed for firms transitioning from the third to the fourth quartile of growth opportunities.
Partitioning the sample into above-and below-median growth firms, confirms this finding with the relatively higher growth group paying higher dividends and the differential between dividends paid by mature and growth firms persisting. Therefore, it appears that reputation building is a motive for paying larger dividends for firms across all lifecycle stages and not solely associated with early-stage firms. Table 1  Sample and lifecycle descriptions  This table summarizes our sample Dickinson (2011) , RE/TE, and firm age. Dividend payout is either dividends-toasset (%) or dividends-to-sales (%), as indicated. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shakeout/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. In Panel C, firms are classified into three lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old using RE/TE. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. In Panel D, firms are classified by firm age quartile. Dickinson (2011) , RE/TE, and firm age. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. In Panel C, firms are classified into three lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old using RE/TE. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. In Panel D, firms are classified by firm age quartile. The number of transitions is reported in parentheses. %∆ is the percentage change in median dividend payout between dates t-1 and t. Table 5  Regression estimates of the dividend-lifecycle relationship  This table reports pooled ordinary least squares estimates for the full sample of firms. The sample period is 1998 to 2004. The dependent variable is dividend payout. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-toassets (%), as indicated. The standard errors are clustered by firm. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third quartile), or old (top quartile), using RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shakeout/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. Firm age is size and industry adjusted. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014) . All other variables are defined in the text. Firmgrowth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-tobook of assets based on the previous three years. All Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-toassets (%), as indicated. The standard errors are clustered by firm. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third quartile), or old (top quartile), using RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shakeout/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. Firm age is size and industry adjusted. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014) . All other variables are defined in the text. Firmgrowth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-tobook of assets based on the previous three years. All The standard errors are clustered by firm. The marginal effects are evaluated at the means of each variable. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third quartile), or old (top quartile), using RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shakeout/decline. Firm age is size and industry adjusted. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014) . All other variables are defined in the text. Firm-growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. All regressions include an intercept term, industry and time dummies but they are not reported.
Dependent . MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014) . Firm-growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. All other variables are defined in the text. All regressions include an intercept term, industry and time dummies but are not reported. The bottom panel outlines the amount of the variation in dividend payout explained by each right hand side variable as a percentage of the variation in dividend payout explained by the right hand side variables as a whole.
Dependent Table 8  The lifecycle model of dividends by level of growth opportunities  This table examines the lifecycle model of dividends for firms with high MBA (above-median) and low MBA (belowmedian). Firm-growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. Panel A reports median dividend payout in each lifecycle stage by level of firm growth. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. Lifecycle stages are determined using Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA). MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. Panel B reports separate pooled ordinary least squares estimates for firms classified as high (above-median) or low (below-median) MBA. The sample period is 1998 to 2004. The standard errors are clustered by firm. All regressions include an intercept term, control variables, industry and time dummies but are not reported. 
